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M A T T H E W  S .  W I S E M A N
Abstract : Between 1947 and 1953, leading scientists at Canada’s Defence 
Research Board (drb) administered physiological and psychological 
experiments on soldiers conducting indoctrination training for Arctic 
warfare. Designed in an attempt to determine the ideal characteristics of 
cold-weather soldiery, one experiment resulted in physical and mental injury 
to two participating troops. Although the army immediately questioned 
its participation in further drb testing because of the sustained injuries, 
ethical issues of human testing seemed not to deeply penetrate military and 
defence discourse concerning the involvement of troops in acclimatisation 
research and indoctrination training. This article examines cold-weather 
human testing to argue that the development of Cold War soldiery in Canada 
conformed to superficial gender ideals about virile masculinity in the early 
postwar period.
“Great physical and mental effort is required under conditions of 
extreme cold and high windchill to remain aggressive. The cold and 
unusual conditions of life can, if allowed, impose a heavy strain on 
morale. Every opportunity must be taken to seek out and destroy the 
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128 The Development of Cold War Soldiery
enemy in order to increase the strain on the enemy, to deprive him of 
rest and time to prepare food, and eventually destroy him.”1
During the early Cold War period, the Canadian Arctic became a training ground for Western forces. Together with American 
and British counterparts, Canadian troops took part in a series of 
military exercises, designed to prepare both men and equipment for 
cold-weather warfare.2 Each exercise aimed specifically to determine 
infantry requirements as well as the tactical techniques and 
coordination methods required for military operations in extremely 
cold winter conditions. The most well-known exercise remains the 
three-month northern excursion named Operation Musk Ox, which 
combined Canada-United States military support and reinforced 
notions that the Canadian Arctic represented the first line of defence 
against a potential attack on North America.3 Less well-known but 
also important to the Canadian military and defence establishment 
was Sun Dog One, a one-month exercise carried out in an effort 
to deduce and overcome environmental challenges unique to Arctic 
military operations.
Sun Dog One served a scientific as well as military purpose. 
During the exercise, scientists of Canada’s Defence Research Board 
1  As quoted in the final report of Sun Dog One, prepared under the direction of 
the Chief of General Staff and published by the Directorate of Military Training; see 
Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One,” RG 24, Volume 4206, File 270-0-89-6, Library and 
Archives Canada (LAC), 12.
2  The Canadian military participated in no fewer than twenty-two northern 
operations in the first decade of the Cold War, including exercises “Eskimo,” “Polar 
Bear,” and “Lemming” (1945); “Musk Ox” (1946); “Moccasin” (1947–1948); “Sigloo” 
(1948–1949); “Cross Country,” “Sweetbriar,” “Sun Dog One,” and “Shoo Fly One” 
(1950); “Sun Dog Two,” “Shoo Fly Two,” “Measureall,” and “Pole Star One, Two 
and Three” (1951–1952); “Sun Dog Three,” “Deer Fly One, Two and Three,” and 
“Prairie Tundra One” (1952); “Prairie Tundra Two” (1952–1953); and “Bull Dog” 
(1953); see C.E. Law, J.A. Easterbrook, and M.F. Coffey, Defence Research Board 
Northern Laboratory: Progress Report on an Assessment of Current Equipment and 
Methods used by Army Personnel for Ground Navigation in the North, 30 June 1954, 
RG 85, Volume 299, File 1009-2[5], LAC. For an abbreviated list of Canadian army 
exercises in the North between 1945 and 1953, including dates, locations, and aims, 
see Andrew B. Godefroy, In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada’s 
Cold War Army (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2014), 87–88.
3  See Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a 
National Insecurity State, 1945–1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 
141–142 and Robert Teigrob, Warming up to the Cold War: Canada and the United 
States’ Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009), 64–65.
2
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(drb) observed trials of Canadian, American, and British cold-weather 
clothing and equipment. Scientists from the drb also conducted 
experimental trials on participating troops as part of an acclimatisation 
and indoctrination programme that aimed to determine the physical 
and psychological requirements of cold-weather soldiery. Symptomatic 
of broader Cold War desires to understand and overcome the natural 
environment, indoctrination training in the Canadian Arctic served 
to regulate anxieties of inadequacy and perpetuate seemingly false 
notions of control and power amongst planners, observers, and 
participants. Although training proved effective and educational, 
the lessons learned came at a cost. Scientists deemed some troops 
physically or temperamentally weak for cold-weather operations and 
thus less favourable for Arctic service than men whose physical and 
mental attributes posed no apparent or potential detriment to the 
morale and effectiveness of the other participating troops.
Neither Sun Dog One nor the cold-weather research conducted 
on participating troops was vital to the continental defence of North 
America, but both provide important insights for considering the 
role and structure of Canada’s postwar military. According to the 
existing literature, the defence of Canada in the nuclear age depended 
primarily on a fully integrated air system that included radar and 
jet interceptors.4 Canada embraced a middle power philosophy and 
bolstered its national security through multilateral and bilateral 
agreements. In the process, the Canadian military underwent 
massive reductions in operating budget and personnel strength. 
Defence against an increasingly hostile Soviet Union depended on 
international cooperation rather than independent professional 
standing forces. Yet Canada’s defence establishment funded scientific 
work to investigate human performance under military training in 
severe cold. drb science conducted in collaboration with the military 
suggests that defence officials were open to the possibility that 
Arctic defence might include a well-trained land element. The science 
speaks to postwar gender ideals as well. Officials equated adequate 
performance in severe cold with virile notions of masculinity. To be 
4  See for example, by date of publication, Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: 
Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945–
1958 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987); Robert Bothwell, The 
Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs, 1998); and Sean M. Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear 
Weapons During the Cold War (Washington: Potomac, 2007).
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a Cold War Arctic soldier meant not only survival in but also the 
defeat of Canada’s most harsh environmental elements. 
Historians have only recently begun to uncover the depth of 
Canada’s Cold War scientific activity, but recent research shows 
the complex integration between the Canadian national defence 
establishment and military.5 Whitney Lackenbauer and Matthew 
Farish have argued that postwar Western military interest in the 
Canadian Arctic signalled not only “the systematic consolidation 
of nature as military entity, but also an extension of the scope 
and terms of militarization to reflect the cautious longevity of the 
Cold War.”6 Situating the postwar northern military exercise in a 
broader environmental discourse, Lackenbauer and Farish explore 
the pervasive legacy of Cold War militarism in Canada in a manner 
that moves beyond the more traditional diplomatic or social analyses 
of the period.7 This article also examines the pervasive legacy of 
Cold War militarism, but highlights human as well as environmental 
aspects. Although Canada’s northern climate and geography 
significantly shaped defence policy in the early postwar years, military 
preparedness was also a direct corollary of defence science. 
Cold-weather human testing represents an interesting aspect of 
military preparedness, but as a topic remains largely unexplored by 
historians. This article examines the connection between military 
indoctrination and scientific cold-weather acclimatisation research in 
an effort to contextualise an important aspect of Canada’s Cold War 
5  Two significant contributions to the field of Canada’s Cold War defence-related 
science include, Andrew B. Godefroy, Defence and Discovery: Canada’s Military 
Space Program, 1945–74 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011); 
and Donald Avery, Pathogens for War: Biological Weapons, Canadian Life Scientists, 
and North American Biodefence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).
6  P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Matthew Farish, “The Cold War on Canadian Soil: 
Militarizing a Northern Environment,” Environmental History 12, no. 4 Special Issue 
on Canada (2007), 920–950.
7  Some other foundational works on Cold War Canada include, by date of 
publication, Whitaker and Marcuse, Cold War Canada (1994); Greg Donaghy, ed., 
Canada and the Early Cold War, 1943–1957 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade, 1998); Andrew Burtch, Give Me Shelter: The Failure of 
Canada’s Cold War Civil Defence (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
2012); Tarah Brookfield, Cold War Comforts: Canadian Women, Child Safety, and 
Global Insecurity, 1945–1975 (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2012); 
Isabel Campbell, Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 1951–64 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013); and Godefroy, In Peace 
Prepared (2014).
4
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legacy while also contributing to a growing international literature 
on human and environmental science in the early postwar period. 
Sun Dog One represents an ideal case study. During the exercise, 
scientists tested the physical and mental qualities of troops operating 
under severe cold-weather conditions. The experiments were part of an 
Arctic acclimatisation research and indoctrination training programme, 
initiated to isolate the ideal male characteristics of cold-weather soldiery. 
In turn, Canada’s defence and military establishment attempted to 
develop a process to isolate men deemed physically and mentally 
valuable to support a northern defence. Sun Dog One consequently 
provides a unique window into the development and impact of Cold 
War soldiery, an intriguing topic about military masculinity that 
provides many insights for Canadian historians and raises important 
questions about the ethics of human testing and defence science in the 
years immediately following the Second World War.
Canadian parachute-qualified personnel 
who will be posted to the 1st Canadian 
Parachute Battalion undertaking winter 
infantry training at A-35 Canadian 
Parachute Training Centre (Canadian 
Army Training Centres and Schools), 
Camp Shilo, Manitoba, Canada, 20 March 
1945. [Capt. Frank Royal / Canada. Dept. 
of National Defence / Library and Archives 
Canada / PA-209726]
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seeds of arctic interest 
Interest in the Arctic increased dramatically during the Second 
World War with the Japanese invasion of the Aleutian Islands, the 
establishment of British and Soviet east-west routes for the transport 
of aircraft, and a series of massive construction projects initiated 
by the United States. North American continental defences began 
to take shape accordingly, as Washington funded the construction 
of extensive infrastructure and facilities to service “isolated” areas 
including the Alaska Highway, airfields to support aircraft service to 
Alaska, over fifty weather stations, and an oil distribution system 
between Yukon and the Northwest Territories named the Canol 
Project. The United States also acquired a lease to an air base at 
Goose Bay, Labrador, to serve as a location from which the air force 
could potentially bomb the Soviet Union and see its aircraft return.8 
At the same time, the Canadian government agreed to co-finance the 
construction of early warning radar systems with the United States. 
Within six years of 1949, contracts stipulated the construction of the 
Pinetree Line, the Mid-Canada Line, and the Distant Early Warning 
(dew) Line.9 
During the 1940s, a proliferation occurred in maps oriented over 
the North Pole.10 Air-age globalism revealed the surprisingly close 
geographic proximity of the Soviet Union, and North American 
territory emerged expansive and vulnerable at the top. In the process, 
the Arctic became a frontier space of both strategic and scientific 
importance, an ideal laboratory for intellectual pursuit that had 
implications of a local and global significance. The American military 
embraced this logic and approached the North as a vital component 
of continental defence but also as one of many hostile environments 
to overcome. The situation led to an expansive and highly entangled 
relationship between military and scientific affiliations, as historians 
8  Peter Kasurak, A National Force: The Evolution of Canada’s Army, 1950–2000 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013), 11.
9  For a detailed timeline of North American air defence cooperation between 
Canada and the United States with regard to radar, see Daniel Heidt and P. 
Whitney Lackenbauer, “Sovereignty for Hire: Civilian Airlift Contractors and the 
Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, 1954–1961,” in P. Whitney Lackenbauer, De-
icing required!: the historical dimension of the Canadian Air Force’s experience in the 
Arctic (Ottawa: National Defence and the Canadian Forces, 2012), 95–112.
10  Matthew Farish, The Contours of America’s Cold War (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota, 2010), 174.
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 24 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol24/iss2/6
  133W I S EMAN
of science and the Cold War have shown.11 As Matthew Farish 
explains in an intricate study of American knowledge production, 
“the Arctic frontier was engineered—not just in the sense of specific 
landscapes and bodies as sites for technical manipulation and control 
but also according to more general principles of development, order, 
and appropriation for scientific and strategic needs.”12 Coupled with the 
growing tensions between the East and West, the Arctic, as both an 
idea and physical space, was ripe for a high-anxiety postwar “assault.” 
Although the terms sovereignty and defence may seem 
interchangeable, in the context of the postwar security environment 
Canada faced two distinct threats. As fears of a Soviet attack grew, 
research teams, administrators, and troops pushed northward to study 
and occupy the largely “unknown” region. Collectively, on behalf of 
the Canadian government, these individuals worked to defend the 
North against Soviet aggression while also promoting territorial 
sovereignty in the midst of increasing encroachment from the United 
States. There was certainly mutual agreement in both Ottawa and 
Washington that precautions were necessary to protect the North 
American continent, but at the same time officials in Canada showed 
concern for the rapid increase of American activity north of the border. 
As noted by Rob Huebert, concerns worsened periodically in Canada 
when various American officials mused about the possibility of “taking 
control” of Canadian territory to prepare their own defences against the 
Soviet threat.13 Yet Canada was not in a position to provide the necessary 
resources required of a modern and effective national defence. In spite of 
the emerging concerns about American encroachment, Canada had little 
choice but to collaborate closely with its southern neighbour in defence 
of the North American continent.
While the nuances of early Cold War defence relations between 
Canada and the United States require further attention, the current 
body of literature seems to agree that the Americans respected 
Canadian claims to territorial sovereignty in the North. Rather than 
annex parts of the seemingly remote and ignored Canadian Arctic, 
11  Ronald E. Doel, “Constituting the Postwar Earth Sciences: The Military’s 
Influence on the Environmental Sciences in the USA after 1945,” Social Studies of 
Science 33, no. 5 (2003), 635–666. 
12  Farish, The Contours of America’s Cold War, 176.
13  Rob Huebert, “Walking and Talking Independence in the Canadian North,” in An 
Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Challenges and Choices for the Future, Brian 
Bow and Patrick Lennox, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Pres, 2008), 119.
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Washington desired to work in collaboration with Ottawa to establish 
the adequate defence system that officials in both cities deemed 
necessary. In many ways, the situation proved quite advantageous for 
Canada. The government gained access to the physical and financial 
resources of United States and simultaneously bolstered its defensive 
position against the Soviet Union. Scholars debate whether Canada 
sacrificed its sovereignty in the process, but diplomatic negotiations 
resulted in bilateral arrangements with real and lasting benefits to 
both Canada and the United States.14 
canada’s postwar military
The Canadian army emerged from the Second World War lacking 
a large staff that could focus on national military strategy. During 
the early postwar period, the office of the science advisor to the 
chief of the general staff at Army Headquarters only had a small 
civilian analytical component. While a few senior Defence Research 
Board (drb) officials were part of the headquarters, the professional 
staff of the Canadian Army Operations Research Establishment 
never exceeded fifteen personnel. As argued by Peter Kasurak, these 
circumstances proved a significant shortcoming in the directive of 
Army Headquarters as it faced the challenges of the emerging Soviet 
threat.15 Nevertheless, the Canadian government authorised the 
creation of an air transportable brigade known as the Mobile Reserve. 
Comprised of three infantry battalions with combat support and 
service support units, the brigade was renamed the Mobile Striking 
Force (msf) in 1948. Officials designed the msf as a preventative 
land element that would deter the Soviets from establishing forward 
14  Shelagh Grant has suggested that Canada sacrificed its sovereignty in 
Arctic defence negotiations with the United States; see Sovereignty or Security: 
Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936–1950 (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 1988). Others have emphasised sound decision-making, 
open dialogue, and respect on both sides. See P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter 
Kikkert, “Sovereignty and Security: Canadian Diplomacy, the United States, and the 
Arctic, 1943–1968,” in In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Greg Donaghy and Michael 
K. Carroll, eds. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011), 101–120. 
15  Kasurak, A National Force, 16.
8
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operating bases in the Canadian North.16 At the time, technology 
restricted long-range bombers from making roundtrip flights over 
the North Pole. Continental defence, therefore, depended on the 
ability of the msf to prevent the Soviets from establishing re-fueling 
service stations on North American territory. The msf also served 
to promote Canadian claims to territorial sovereignty by facilitating 
operational cooperation with United States forces.
Although the msf bolstered the presence of the Canadian military 
in the North, scholars tend to agree that the postwar land element 
served only a partial role in the defence of the North American 
continent. This assessment finds support in the personal convictions of 
Canada’s Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton. Unconvinced 
that the Soviets posed a direct threat against the Canadian North, 
Claxton never spent more resources on ground defences than was 
politically necessary. He provided the minimum support required to 
sustain the msf and restricted military funds elsewhere. Under his 
authority, the Canadian army did not figure prominently in either 
foreign or domestic policy.17 
During the early postwar period, Ottawa embraced a middle 
power philosophy and sought to secure Canadian sovereignty at 
home and abroad through involvement in international partnerships 
such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (nato), North 
American Air Defence Command (norad), and the United Nations 
(un). Multilateral and increasingly bilateral agreements provided the 
backbone of Canadian defence. The military underwent a drastic 
reduction as a result, and the Mackenzie King government reallocated 
federal finances toward other national priorities that included veterans’ 
benefits, family allowances and other social-welfare programs.18 
Within two years of the end of the Second World War, the army 
reduced in personnel strength from 478,090 to only 15,852.19 
16  For information on the MSF, see Sean M. Maloney, “The Mobile Striking Force 
and Continental Defence 1948–1955,” Canadian Military Journal 2, no. 2 (1993), 
75–88; Bernd Horn, Bastard Sons: An Examination of Canada’s Airborne Experience 
1941–1995 (St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001); and Raymond Stouffer, 
“Military Culture and the Mobile Striking Force” in P. Whitney Lackenbauer, De-icing 
required!, 58–70.
17  See for example, Colonel Bernd Horn, ed., The Canadian War of War: Serving 
the National Interest (Toronto: Dundurn, 2006); and Kasurak, A National Force. 
18  For an assessment of the impact that federal finance reallocation had on the 
postwar Canadian military, see Andrew Godefroy, In Peace Prepared.
19  Kasurak, A National Force, 11.
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As an instrument of national power, the Canadian military suffered 
from a lack of coherent and durable political guidance and became 
both fragmented and disjointed.20 While American and Canadian 
scientific and defensive interests largely coincided in the period, 
government officials in Ottawa supported research of a non-strategic 
orientation. Hugh Keenleyside, for instance, shared with Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Lester Pearson the view that Canada should support 
resources and research over strategy and politics.21 As deputy minister 
of mines and resources, commissioner of the Northwest Territories, 
and chairman of the Arctic Research Advisory Committee of the 
drb, Keenleyside was a high-ranking official with a significant level 
of influence on northern affairs and finance spending. He received 
an informal education on the Canadian North and its indigenous 
populations from Arctic geographers such as Vilhjalmur Stefansson, 
Erling Porslid, and Trevor Lloyd, and used his position in government 
to promote the spread of “industrial civilization” northward.22 Defence 
considerations in the North were lower on his agenda than the work 
of scientists, explorers, administrators, educators, doctors, and social 
workers.23 He participated in the creation and subsequent activities 
of the Arctic Institute of North America, and supported the drb as 
modern scientific establishment.
In spite of rapid demobilisation and cost cutting, the Canadian 
military maintained a notable contribution to national security in the 
immediate postwar years. As argued by Andrew Godefroy, “[that] 
the postwar Canadian Army was ultimately capable of innovating 
and adapting to meet new threats alongside its two main allies under 
such conditions suggests that a great deal of military enterprise and 
innovation occurred within the institution.”24 Godefroy does not 
suggest that all changes to postwar military structure were novel and 
successful, but he nonetheless maintains that historical scholarship is 
too critical of the Canadian military during the early Cold War period. 
20  Howard G. Coombs and Richard Goette, “Supporting the Pax Americana: 
Canada’s Military and the Cold War,” in Colonel Bernd Horn, ed., The Canadian 
War of War: Serving the National Interest (Toronto: Dundurn, 2006), 265–296. 
21  Hugh L. Keenleyside, Memoirs of Hugh L. Keenleyside, Volume 2: On the Bridge 
of Time (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), 308.
22  Ibid.
23  Ibid., 310.
24  Andrew Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 49.
10
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Godefroy’s assessment finds support when we consider northern 
cooperation between the military and drb scientists. While the air threat 
to North America dominated strategic considerations in Ottawa during 
the early postwar period, defence officials remained cognisant of the 
vulnerability of the Canadian North by sea and land. In advance of a 
potential Soviet land attack, the military turned to science to find and 
prepare men for the potential cold-weather battlefield. Defence planners 
deemed cold climate training important to the development of troop 
indoctrination and preparation, and intelligence confirmed the need to 
prepare a defence against the shortest and most direct route over the North 
Pole. Canadian troops were to learn how to survive and use their weapons 
under Arctic conditions, while drb scientists were to isolate the masculine 
characteristics required of cold-weather soldiery. These circumstances 
developed from a Cold War ideology in which the environment featured 
prominently as a “laboratory” for scientific exploitation.25
postwar military activity in the north
The Canadian military first tested the adequacy of military men 
and equipment in the North during the winter of 1945–1946. 
Operations Eskimo, Polar Bear, and Lemming were designed to 
determine the effects of severe climatic conditions on the mobility 
and combat efficiency of Canada’s striking forces. The location of 
each exercise differed, which allowed for the testing of equipment 
in northern environments under varying conditions and challenges 
of both terrain and temperature.26 Exercises Musk Ox and North 
occurred the following year, as the army continued to improve 
tactics, techniques, and procedures for living and fighting in severe 
cold-weather conditions. None of these field exercises were large-scale 
operations, nor were they conducted to test the ability of joint land-
25  While Canadian literature outside Lackenbauer and Farish (see note 6) has yet 
to broach this topic, similar themes have been addressed in the American context. 
See, for instance, Matthew Farish, “The Lab and the Land: Overcoming the Arctic 
in Cold War Alaska,” Isis 104, no. 1 (2013), 1–29. 
26  For a brief overview of Canada’s Winter Warfare Programme of 1944–1945, see 
Hugh A. Halliday, “Recapturing the North: Exercises “Eskimo,” “Polar Bear” and 
“Lemming,” 1945,” Canadian Military History 6, no. 2 (1997): 29–38.
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air operations to resist mock Soviet aggressor forces.27 As a result, 
the army continued to conduct both individual and joint exercises 
with the Royal Canadian Air Force (rcaf). 
Arctic warfare differed considerably from winter warfare in that 
its potential battlefield existed in vast spaces only reachable by air. 
Whereas units conducting winter warfare could rely on existing 
roads, railheads, and other supply infrastructure, Arctic warfare 
units trained to maximise self-containment and rely only on available 
air supply.28 Canada took part in cold-weather warfare exercises in 
both Arctic and sub-Arctic conditions. Canadian and American 
military planners defined the “true” Arctic as any terrain north of the 
treeline, including tundra and mountain ranges. Conversely, planners 
defined the sub-Arctic as any northern treed terrain, including the 
treed plain of northern Manitoba and Saskatchewan, the Northwest 
Territories, the mountains of northern British Columbia, the Yukon, 
and southern Alaska.29 
In May 1946, the United States proposed to Canada a unified 
Arctic defence plan on the premise that neither the oceans nor the 
vast territoriality of the Arctic was anymore an adequate barrier to 
protect the northern half of the North American continent against 
long-range weapons or invading armies.30 In the same month, the 
Canadian chiefs of staff approved the formation of an Interservice 
Committee on Winter Warfare, with a sub-committee on winter 
warfare research. By 1947 defence science expanded significantly 
in Canada and the sub-committee was subsequently reorganised as 
the Arctic Research Advisory Committee under the chairmanship 
of Hugh Keenleyside, the deputy minister of mines and resources 
and commissioner of the Northwest Territories.31 The committee 
held its first meeting on 15 May and decided that, while science 
could assist military operations in the Arctic, the military could also 
27  Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 85.
28  Halliday, “Recapturing the North,” 29–38.
29  Dr. O.M. Solandt, Exercise “Sweetbriar”: An Address to The Empire Club of 
Toronto, 30 March 1950, RG 24, Volume 2484, File HQS-736-10-17-2-5, LAC.
30  James Reston, “Unified Arctic Defense Plan Proposed by U.S. to Canada: Joint 
Bases, Weather Stations in Far North, Coordinated Training and Equipping of 
Forces in Scheme Put to Ottawa,” New York Times, 18 May 1946, 1.
31  Defence Research Board Arctic Research Advisory Committee, 5 December 1949, 
Appendix A “Summary of Activities of the Arctic Research Advisory Committee,” 
RG 85, Volume 298, File 1009-2[2], LAC.
12
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be of considerable assistance to scientific research by provision of 
transportation, facilities, and personnel on occasion.
Although top officials in the Canadian defence establishment 
showed little interest in placing standing forces in the North, support 
for cold-weather military exercise training ran deep. Speaking to 
the House of Commons on 17 March 1950, Minister of National 
Defence Brooke Claxton spoke about his experience as an observer 
of exercise Sweetbriar, which took place during the winter of 1949–
1950.32 The exercise tested the latest developments in clothing, food, 
aircraft, vehicles, weapons, and other equipment and material, but 
its primary objective was to develop doctrine and procedures for the 
employment of combined Canada-United States forces operating in 
the sub-Arctic.33 Over five thousand combined forces took part in the 
ten-day exercise, which also included 978 motor vehicles and more 
than 100 aircraft. Sweetbriar was the largest joint Canada-United 
States northern military exercise at the time, so when speaking to the 
House, Claxton congratulated all officers and men who had, in his 
estimation, contributed to the success of the exercise “in accordance 
with the best traditions of the Canadian forces.” Claxton further 
applauded the exercise by noting specifically the effectiveness of 
cooperation between the army and air force, and Canadian and 
American troops. 
Claxton was not the only top Canadian defence official to speak 
favourably about northern military training. A few weeks later on 
30 March, Omond Solandt, Chairman of the Defence Research 
Board, made an address to the Empire Club of Toronto in which he 
spoke about his experience as a scientific observer of Sweetbriar.34 
Echoing Claxton’s comments, Solandt spoke of Sweetbriar with 
specific reference to training and equipment for combined sub-Arctic 
operations. The exercise did not involve new weapons and took place 
in weather conditions that were less severe than those encountered 
by both Canadian and American troops in training, but it did inspire 
novel equipment development and the need for further controlled 
cold-weather environmental training. The most important single 
32  Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates, 21st Parliament, 2nd 
Session: Vol. 1, 17 March 1950, 853–854.
33  Ibid.
34  Dr. O.M. Solandt, Exercise “Sweetbriar”: An Address to The Empire Club of 
Toronto, 30 March 1950, RG 24, Volume 2484, File HQS-736-10-17-2-5, LAC.
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lesson of Sweetbriar was, according to Solandt, the importance of and 
ease with which the Canadian and us armies operated harmoniously 
and effectively in severe cold conditions. When questioned about the 
success of the exercise, other Canadian and American military officials 
who attended as observers were noncommittal. Some expressed shock at 
the state of defences in the Canadian North, while others optimistically 
believed joint military preparedness remedied any existing deficiencies.35 
With regard to both the training of men and the use of equipment in 
cold weather, Canada’s military and defence establishment determined 
many weaknesses of its northern defences. The exercise also made clear 
that neither Canada nor the United States was ready to conduct winter 
warfare; additional training was required. 
Exercise Sweetbriar displayed the potential ability of troops to 
operate efficiently in the sub-Arctic and demonstrate the adequacy 
of logistical support under such conditions.36 Combined support was 
an essential component of exercise Musk Ox, but not under the force 
strength that was available during Sweetbriar. Observers of Sweetbriar 
pointed out certain conditions incident to northern exercises that 
required improvement, but overall the exercise successfully dispelled 
unnecessary fears associated with cold-weather military operations. 
With proper clothing, equipment and training, troops were able to 
manoeuvre under sub-zero temperatures with fewer actual mock 
casualties than estimates had forecast. Observers concluded that 
logistic support was adequate to maintain larger forces and ongoing 
military operations in Canada’s northern environment. Similar 
conclusions were being made simultaneously about 2,000 kilometres 
east at Fort Churchill, Manitoba by participants and observers of 
military exercise Sun Dog One.
sun dog one
Exercise Sun Dog One was an extension of infantry training that 
had taken place at Fort Churchill during the winter of 1948–1949. 
Located on the west bank of Hudson Bay in Manitoba’s northeast 
35  Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates, 21st Parliament, 2nd 
Session: Vol. 4, 9 June 1950, 3408.
36  Extract from US Army Field Forces Newsletter, 1 May 1950, RG 24, Volume 
2484, File HQS-736-10-17-2-5, LAC.
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corner, Fort Churchill’s location, terrain, and harsh winter weather 
made it an ideal environmental locale for northern military training 
and scientific defence research. Sun Dog One comprised 251 
personnel, which by comparison made the exercise significantly 
smaller than Sweetbriar.37 The exercise consisted of an entirely self-
contained and mobile force, who lived and travelled for nearly one 
month close to Fort Churchill. The tactical goal of Sun Dog One was 
to facilitate the appreciation of the probable role of armour, field 
artillery, and engineers in support of one infantry company operating 
in a severe cold-weather environment.38 All appreciations assumed 
that supply to all units was available. The one-month time allowance 
enabled repetition of certain techniques and ensured time for exercise 
workability, photographic retakes, and variation in weather.39 Planners 
sacrificed some measure of realism for scientific observation.
The operational concept of exercise Sun Dog One envisaged the 
pursuit and destruction of an enemy party approximately fifty strong, 
which dropped near the Hudson Bay railway at Chesnaye. The 
exercise began on 16 February 1950 and ended nearly one month later 
on 15 March. Planners chose the route and terrain of the exercise 
specifically to test the supply and communication organisation of 
participating personnel. The first leg of the route took troops through 
heavily bushed terrain on a trail prepared by a Royal Canadian 
Engineers Test Team. The remaining distance traversed flat and open 
tundra covered by many small lakes and sloughs. In open areas, snow 
was hard, shallow, and rough with wind anvils, while in treed areas 
it collected in deep and soft powdery drifts. Temperatures during the 
exercise were somewhat below the normal mean for that winter. The 
lowest temperature recorded was minus forty-two degrees Celsius 
and the mean approximately minus twenty-nine degrees Celsius. The 
maximum recorded wind chill was 2,300 or approximately minus 
fifty degrees Celsius and the mean was 1,700 or approximately minus 
thirty degrees Celsius.40 While these temperatures were comparatively 
higher than other Arctic locales from the same winter, high winds 
37  Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One,” RG 24, Volume 4206, File 270-0-89-6, LAC.
38  Training Wing Fort Churchill: Exercise Sun Dog 1, RG 24, Volume 2484, File 
HQS-726-40-39-7, LAC.
39  For a detailed description of Sun Dog One, included photographs of the exercise, 
see Brief on Exercise “Sun Dog One,” 25 February 1950, RG 24, Volume 2484, File 
HQS-726-40-39-7, LAC.
40  Ibid.
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experienced during the exercise did at times drastically increase the 
rate of heat loss in participating troops.
Canadian exercises in winter and Arctic warfare prior to Sun 
Dog One demonstrated the limits of troops operating in demanding 
conditions, not of survival but of endurance. Varying topography and 
climate in both dry and wet cold conditions reduced the operational 
effectiveness of all forces. Sun Dog One was a combined military 
exercise of a tactical nature in Canada’s eastern Arctic. The exercise 
served to test certain military assumptions about cold-weather 
operations and demonstrated many operational difficulties peculiar 
to Canada’s northern environment. For instance, troops found that 
the same clothing that enabled them to conduct operations in the 
Canadian Arctic also reduced their manoeuvrability and overall 
effectiveness. Clothing restricted motor control, particularly during 
periods of high wind chill when closed parka hoods reduced visibility 
and hearing. Mitts restricted dexterity of the hands and the troops’ 
ability to handle weapons. Frequent and rapid weather changes also 
significantly decreased the operational effectives of both men and 
equipment during Sun Dog One. As noted in a diary of the exercise, 
Canadian parachute-qualified personnel who will be posted to the 1st Canadian Parachute 
Battalion undertaking winter infantry training at A-35 Canadian Parachute Training Centre 
(Canadian Army Training Centres and Schools), Camp Shilo, Manitoba, Canada, 20 March 
1945. [Capt. Frank Royal / Canada. Dept. of National Defence / Library and Archives Canada / PA-209722]
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the constant breakdown of snowmobiles was a dominating feature 
of the troop experience.41 Such reoccurring failures of equipment 
significantly reduced opportunity for tactical study and in turn 
slightly obscured the value of recorded information. Yet the exercise 
as a whole allowed observers to make many useful conclusions about 
cold-weather military operations. 
acclimatisation and indoctrination
Considering the vast range of the potential cold-weather battlefield, 
acclimatisation of personnel to the Arctic environment was a chief 
scientific concern of Canada’s defence establishment early in the 
Cold War. While making his remarks about exercise Sweetbriar to 
the House on 17 March 1950, Minister of Defence Brooke Claxton 
stated: “Fighting in the north we know requires specially trained 
personnel of high morale and top physical condition with first-class 
equipment and air supremacy. These have been our targets and we 
are making good progress.”42 At the time, the logistical difficulties of 
cold-weather military preparedness of both men and equipment had 
extended beyond the institutional capabilities of the army, or so was 
the belief of Canada’s top military advisers. 
By order of Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, Chief of the 
General Staff, the Canadian army conducted exercise Sun Dog One 
in part to assist the Defence Research Board (drb) in the execution 
of its Acclimatization Research Programme.43 Established in 1947, 
the drb was as an agency of the Department of National Defence. 
As Canada’s first peacetime military science establishment, the drb’s 
primary mandate was to provide scientific and technical assistance 
to the Canadian armed forces as well as policy advice to the minister 
of national defence.44 The board was civilian staffed and directed, 
but a significant portion of its personnel had military experience 
41  Ibid.
42  Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates, 21st Parliament, 2nd 
Session: Vol. 1, 17 March 1950, 854.
43  Army Headquarters, 3 January 1950, RG 24, Volume 2484, File HQS-726-40-39-
7, LAC.
44  For an institutional history covering the early formative years of the DRB, see 
Captain D.J. Goodspeed, DRB: A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1958).
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from conducting operations research in the Second World War.45 
Operational researchers and defence scientists helped the military better 
understand the many characteristics of winter warfare by collecting raw 
data for further analysis through study of army physical training exercises.46 
Among the more active of drb’s research facilities in the early Cold War 
period was its Defence Research Northern Laboratory at Fort Churchill, a 
location that had an initial construction budget of one and a half million 
dollars in 1948–1949.47 
Although northern military exercises aimed to determine 
the requirements and tactical techniques of supporting arms and 
services operating in cold climate conditions, a select number also 
supported Canada’s wider military and defence research that aimed 
to understand the physical and psychological requirements of cold-
weather soldiery.48 The drb conducted its Acclimatization Research 
Programme as part of this process at Fort Churchill during the 
winter of 1949–1950. The research aimed to study the effect of 
vitamin C on the physiological adaptation to cold of personnel while 
in Canada’s Arctic environment. Scientists administered two sets of 
pills to two groups of troops who conducted physically demanding 
military operations under severe cold as part of exercise Sun Dog 
One.49 The first group received placebo pills containing no vitamin 
45  Operational research (OR) involved scientific investigations carried out in the 
field of operations and became widely recognised during the Second World War 
when careful observations, analyses, and conclusions were first applied profitably to 
wartime operations. For information on Canada’s wartime OR in the Second World 
War, see Terry Copp, Montgomery’s Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest 
Europe (Waterloo, Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 
2000). Postwar OR concentrated primarily on combinations which involved weapons, 
communications, transports and other systems that employed electronic and 
mechanical components; see 44327—The Defence Research Board Canada, JGD/
MG01 (John G. Diefenbaker fonds), Volume 76, File VII/A/614, University Archives 
and Special Collections, University of Saskatchewan. The Operational Research 
Group of the DRB was specifically responsible for projects of joint-service or general 
defence interest and for supply and coordination of civilian scientific personnel. See 
Defence Research Board: Debate of the Annual Estimates in the House of Commons 
1952, RG 24, Volume 4210, File 69-180-262, LAC.
46  Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 85.
47  Programme of Works for 1948–49 Joint Testing Station Fort Churchill, Manitoba, 
RG 24, Volume 4150, File 52-751-268-1 vol. 2, LAC.
48  Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One,” RG 24, Volume 4206, File 270-0-89-6, LAC.
49  The exact number of test participants remains unclear, but the DRB initially 
requested the volunteer participation of thirty soldiers. See Defence Research 
Northern Laboratory: Acclimatization Research Programme 194-50 Fort Churchill, 
RG 24 vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-39-7, LAC.
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C while the second group received pills containing 500 mg per day. Each 
test participant underwent a medical examination prior to and following 
the experiment. Scientists also conducted urinalysis, blood pressure 
measurements, and blood analysis twice weekly on troops throughout the 
duration of the programme, which lasted from January to March 1950. 
Each participant was administered pills prior to, during, and following 
exposure to cold and was granted one week extra leave following the 
completion of the test period. In their capacity as observers, drb scientists 
received instructions to avoid doing anything that would interfere with 
the conduct of exercise Sun Dog One. The evaluation of the capabilities 
and limitations of all participating arms and services was important to 
both the Canadian military and defence establishment in evolving tactical 
doctrine for northern warfare.50 
The drb’s acclimatisation research associated with Sun Dog 
One was not the first attempt by scientists to deduce information 
about cold-weather operations from participants. Scientists utilised 
volunteers as test subjects in similar trials a year prior to Sun Dog 
One in January and February 1949. Arrangements at the time were 
in place to use volunteer troops stationed in the North, but before 
tests commenced the army decided to pull its participation. In order 
to meet the requirements of lead scientist Norman Mackworth, a 
meeting was then held of administrative and service heads when, 
“[a]fter much controversy over morale and other problems … it was 
realised that the absolute limit had been reached on the provision 
of test subjects.”51 Tests went ahead nonetheless and the scientists 
utilised persons already employed at Defence Research Northern 
Laboratory (drnl) in Fort Churchill. 
Funded jointly by Canada and the United Kingdom, the tests 
conducted at drnl were the first in a series of two.52 Fort Churchill 
provided researchers the opportunity to conduct fieldwork in the 
50  General Instruction for Observers Participating in Exercise “Sun Dog One,” RG 
24 vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-39-7, LAC.
51  Provision of Test Subjects for Defence Research Board, RG 24 vol. 2484, file 
HQS-726-40-17-11, LAC.
52  The acclimatisation research conducted by Norman Mackworth and his team 
was jointly financed by the DRB of Canada, as well as the Medical Research Council 
and the Medical Department of the Royal Navy. For a published account of the 
experiments, see N.H. Mackworth, “Finger Numbness in Very Cold Winds,” Journal 
of Applied Physiology 5, (1953), 533–543 and N.H. Mackworth, “Cold Acclimatization 
and Finger Numbness,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 
Biological Sciences 143, no. 912, (1955), 392–407.
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Canadian North under “natural conditions of cold” and compare 
results to data recorded from physical observations of participants 
who underwent similar examinations in a simulated cold-weather 
experiment at Cambridge, England. Although the army was tentative 
to cooperate, it seems troops already stationed at drnl did eventually 
participate as volunteers.53 Mackworth and his team conducted two 
experiments to test the hypothesis that cold exposure may bring 
about changes in skin texture that act as a “glove,” thereby improving 
manual dexterity and performance in the cold by protecting the hands 
against the transmission and loss of heat. In the first test, researchers 
compared the sensitivity of a group of Aboriginal troops considered “well 
acclimatised” to that of “unacclimatised” white troops. In the second, 
researchers compared recorded skin sensitivity measurements taken 
before and after exposure to severe cold while on exercise to results of 
similar tests conducted in the Cambridge laboratory simulation. Results 
from both cases reported no significant differences between those 
considered already acclimatised and those not.54
Thirty-five volunteers comprised the first test group, of which 
twenty were members of the Canadian army, nine were scientists, and 
the other six were “labourers.” Mackworth and his team conducted 
finger numbness tests on volunteer participants using an experimental 
V-test apparatus. The V-test apparatus consisted of a flat wooden 
ruler cut in half. The two halves of the ruler were bolted together at 
one end, and at the other end were separated by half an inch. The gap 
between the two inner edges of the device ranged between zero and 
thirteen millimetres, according to the particular part that touched 
the tip of the tested finger. Instructed to look away as researchers 
administered the test, participants said whether they felt a gap when 
53  Available records are slightly ambiguous on this point. Military documents 
suggest troops from exercise Prairie Tundra Two (1952) were utilised as test subjects, 
whereas Mackworth’s published report in the Journal of Applied Physiology dates 
the experiments to January and February 1949. The dates provided by Mackworth 
coincide with the operational dates of Sigloo, seemingly making it the exercise during 
which troops also volunteered to participate in acclimatisation research. It is also 
plausible that troops volunteered to take part in DRNL research while not as part 
of a formal military exercise.
54  The “test subject” indicated when he first felt the two edges of the apparatus 
as one; the width of the gap was the discrimination score charted on the “numbness 
index.” For information on the administration of the V-test at Fort Churchill, see 
M.F. Coffey, “Results of a Test for Changes in Skin Sensitive after a Period of 
Acclimatization to the Cold,” DRNL Technical Paper No. 16, November 1953, RG 
85, vol. 299, file 1009-2[5], LAC.
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the examiner firmly pressed the two edges against the tip of the left 
forefinger. Researchers obtained ten such threshold readings from 
each participant prior to cold exposure and averaged the readings to 
establish an individual control.55 
To test participants in the cold, researchers constructed a canvas-
lined tunnel equipped with a system of adjustable shutters designed 
to channel prevailing winds. Researchers administered tests only on 
“cold” or “very cold” days, when temperatures ranged from minus 
twenty-five to minus thirty-five degrees Celsius and wind speeds 
in the tunnel ranged from zero to ten miles per hour.56 Each test 
participant entered the wind tunnel and stood at such a position 
that their test hand was to the direction of the wind. A woolen glove 
fully covered the test hand, except for one finger, left entirely bare 
for an exposure time of three minutes. While exposed to the cold, 
researchers obtained ten threshold readings from each participant. 
The first reading was after one minute had passed and the others 
roughly at twelve-second intervals thereafter. Administrators of the 
test used these readings to devise a “numbness index,” and compared 
the effect of cold and wind speed on manual dexterity.57
Mackworth calculated his data based on results obtained during 
cold exposure at five to ten minute intervals. He used measurements 
from the two-point tactile discrimination V-test to assess the finger 
numbing effects of severe cold and wind chill conditions. Researchers 
recorded 109 pairs in total, and Mackworth concluded that even 
moderate winds lowered skin temperatures and increased the risk of 
frostbite. He made this assessment partly in response to injuries that 
occurred during the tests. On 9 February 1949, three “test subjects” 
reported to the local station hospital complaining of pain in the left 
index finger. The hospital report dated two days later stated that all 
three men were “in a painful stage of defrosting” that “render[ed] their 
fingers useless for an average of seven days.”58 Prevented from carrying 
out their regular duties as a result of their physical injuries, these men 
were also reported to have had suffered from a “morale problem.”59
55  For a photograph of the V-test apparatus, see Mackworth, “Finger Numbness in 
Very Cold Winds,” 533–543.
56  Ibid.
57  Ibid., 535.
58  Provision of Test Subjects for Defence Research Board, RG 24 vol. 2484, file 
HQS-726-40-17-11, LAC.
59  Ibid.
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Mackworth told a slightly different version of the story. In a 
published report of the experiments, he noted two rather than three 
injuries: “Two of the subjects later developed a minor frostbite in the 
finger that had been exposed and both were from the small group of 
four persons who experienced the worst environment of all—the highest 
wind speed of 8.1 to 10.0 mph and the very cold air temperature.”60 
Under such extreme conditions, a change from normal sensitivity to 
“total anesthesia,” or the complete loss of feeling in the finger, occurred 
in under two and half minutes from the beginning of exposure. The 
sudden onset of numbness resulted in a “[p]rolonged lowering of skin 
temperature … especially in subject D, who later developed a rather 
more severe lesion perhaps because of the nutritional impairment 
[that] lasted longer [possibly as a result of reduced blood flow].”61 Both 
frostbite “subjects developed definite surface reddening of the exposed 
finger” in under three minutes of return to the warm room, at which 
point “their fingers were still nearly freezing.”62
Mackworth further described both frostbite victims with specific 
reference to each injury: “Subject C had a pale, white area about 
two inches long and one-quarter of an inch broad on the index finger 
on the side that had been nearest the wind source. This stretched 
from the proximal inter-phalangeal joint to the tip of the index finger 
where it broadened to about half-an-inch across.”63 The injury was 
severe enough to restrict movement of the measured joint by forty-
five degrees and caused “some pain and tenderness but no detectable 
swelling.” Yet by comparison, the other frostbite victim fared worse, 
according to Mackworth: “Subject D was more severely affected and 
had a definitely red and swollen forefinger … [that] was markedly 
tender and painful, although it did not keep the subject awake at 
night.”64 Fortunately, for both men, these injuries, what Mackworth 
referred to as “accidental” and “temporary” effects of research, did 
not prevent complete recovery. In both cases, the injured troops 
returned to work after being off for four days. 
Although Mackworth concluded that only two out of all tested 
personnel succumbed to frostbite, another thirteen recorded single 
60  Mackworth, “Finger Numbness in Very Cold Winds,” 538.
61  Ibid., 539.
62  Ibid.
63  Ibid.
64  Ibid., 540.
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skin temperature readings lower than five degrees Celsius following 
exposure to severe cold. Of the thirteen, seven had skin temperature 
readings in the range between those recorded of “subjects C and 
D,” or three point four degrees Celsius and minus two point three 
degrees Celsius. At such low skin temperatures the onset of pain felt 
by participants, especially those subjected to wind chill conditions, 
resulted in reports of “definite discomfort.” The provision of “test 
subjects” stopped immediately following the reported injuries, but on 
24 February drnl and Mackworth submitted a further request for 
test subjects for use in “modified less-severe tests.”65 In response to 
the request, the army agreed to provide volunteers for use in manual 
dexterity tests where, according to military records, “no temporary 
or permanent injury [would] result.”66 Moving forward, the army 
agreed only to provide volunteers on the grounds that experimental 
trials did not interrupt military training. 
Sun Dog One offered an opportunity to extend acclimatisation 
research conducted at drnl. While scientific testing was limited to 
a select number of volunteers, all participating troops underwent a 
three week long indoctrination course prior to the exercise at either 
Shilo, Manitoba or Petawawa, Ontario, followed by an additional 
two weeks of Arctic acclimatisation training at Fort Churchill.67 
Training involved manoeuvres in severe cold as well as the attempted 
development of a specific mental acuity derived specifically from 
the necessity to overcome the determinants of manual dexterity 
in northern military operations. To meet this goal, indoctrination 
training included lectures and exercises on snow craft, sea-ice, bush 
living, and over snow vehicles.68 Troops learned how to erect tents, 
use sleeping bags, give first aid, use a cooker, ski and snowshoe, 
transport by sled and sleigh, navigate, and protect their hands in 
order to properly and effectively handle metal weapons and supplies 
in extreme cold.69 Indoctrination also adopted cold-weather living 
65  Provision of Test Subjects for Defence Research Board, RG 24 vol. 2484, file 
HQS-726-40-17-11, LAC.
66  Ibid.
67  Wainwright, Alberta was also used as a location for indoctrination training but 
not in preparation for Sun Dog One—the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry 
were indoctrinated there in training for Sweetbriar; see George Bain, “Canadians 
Show Up Favorably,” The Globe and Mail, 6 March 1950, 17.
68  “Arctic Training Cuts Casualties,” The Globe and Mail, 21 February 1948, 3.
69  “Will Teach War This Winter At Four Canadian Schools,” The Globe and Mail, 
29 November 1948, 17.
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and survival techniques known to Inuit. Troops learned to construct 
“snowhouses” similar to the igloo, tested clothing and dress techniques 
other than army standard, and practiced Arctic navigational methods 
that utilised demarcation points in the natural environment around Fort 
Churchill.70 
cold-weather performance and military masculinity
Based on the collective experience of Arctic acclimatisation and 
indoctrination, the final report of Sun Dog One declared that ten 
weeks was the minimum period acceptable for northern cold-weather 
training up to the battalion level. A proposed schedule of training 
suggested three weeks indoctrination, two weeks trades training, 
three weeks cold-weather familiarisation, and two weeks collective 
training. In order to be of proper value, the report further suggested 
that training only take place in conditions of climate and terrain 
comparable to those of the projected theatre. Otherwise, the success 
of the military operation “would be seriously prejudiced.”71 The 
report concluded that properly trained and equipped troops could 
operate successfully and with a degree of high morale in climates of 
extreme cold for periods up to thirty days under active conditions. 
The “ordinary” soldier conducting “normal” duties was comparable 
in efficiency in the North to the solider operating in other, more 
temperate theatres. Yet the efficiency of the tradesman in tasks 
requiring manual dexterity was as little as 50 per cent of “normal” 
under severe cold weather and high wind conditions. 
Observers of Sun Dog One also noted that tactical mobility, 
both dismounted and mechanised, was a primary deficiency of the 
exercise. Three out of every five men were required to either haul 
or carry the group living equipment, which left only a maximum of 
40 per cent human strength to transport infantry support weapons, 
additional ammunition, and fulfill other necessary operational duties. 
Observers considered this unacceptable and recommended in the exercise 
70  The term igloo derives from the Inuit word iglu (plural igluit), which can refer to a 
structure built of any material and is not restricted exclusively to snowhouses. For details 
on “snowhouse” construction at Fort Churchill as part of indoctrination training, see 
Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One,” RG 24, Volume 4206, File 270-0-89-6, LAC.
71  Ibid.
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final report that weight reductions in rations, fuel, tentage, and other 
operational equipment be implemented to produce the “lower standard of 
comfort” necessary to overcome the “dangers and hardships of the cold 
[that] have been brought into reasonable perspective” by Sun Dog One.72 
Manliness was a purview of the successful troop on Sun Dog 
One. Although the conclusions of the Royal Canadian Infantry Corps 
conceded, “there is no requirement for special troops” to conduct cold-
weather military operations, “special Arctic training” was determined 
necessary to acclimatise and indoctrinate “ordinary” soldiers. Under 
conclusions and recommendations of personnel, the final report of 
Sun Dog One noted the necessity of indoctrination to “weed out any 
soldiers who are weak physically or who are NOT temperamentally 
suited to be part of a small group for a long period.”73 Indoctrination 
aimed specifically to remove the “undesirables” who “only cause a 
lowering of morale and do not pull their share of the weight.”74 This 
extended to persons with glasses or persons who had undergone 
skin grafting on the face, as both might be unable to operate to the 
required level of efficiency in certain cold-weather capacities. 
Military discourse also equated performance in the cold to 
attitudes about virile masculinity. In exceptional circumstances, 
frostbite necessitating medical attention was a matter of disciplinary 
action. In other words, planners of Sun Dog One recommended 
that troops receive penalty for personal injury that resulted from 
“negligible” exposure to severe cold.75 If frostbite were to occur, 
troops were to assume personal responsibility for their injuries and 
report for subsequent punishment. Despite this recommendation, 
there seems to be no record of disciplinary action ever having resulted 
from a frostbite injury. Nevertheless, the forethought does highlight 
the gauche understanding of virile notions toward the development of 
cold-weather soldiery. The military ultimately concluded, “troops need 
not be hand-picked” for Arctic service but “some weeding out during 
the training period must be permitted to eliminate temperamentally 
or physically unsuitable men who would otherwise become liabilities 
72  Ibid.
73  Ibid.
74  Ibid.
75  Disciplinary action was “taken against personnel in camp suffering from frostbite 
when there [was] evidence of negligence,” see Provision of Test Subjects for Defence 
Research Board, RG 24 vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-17-11, LAC.
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during operation.”76 Evocative of this very process, acclimatisation 
and indoctrination was symptomatic of broader Cold War desires to 
understand and overcome physical and climatic constraints, where 
science, as Matthew Farish points out, was used in an attempt to 
create the “masculine Cold Warrior” capable of recognising and 
regulating as far as possible “a set of hostile natural environments.”77
In creating space for Canada’s cold-weather soldier to assume the 
conceptualised role of the Cold War national protector, acclimatisation 
research and indoctrination training perpetuated and legitimised 
postwar modernist ideals of masculinity. Research and training 
aimed to equip troops with the proper levels of pugnacity, truculence, 
and testosterone required to remain effectively “aggressive” under 
conditions of extreme cold. Contemporary attitudes suggested great 
physical and mental strength derived from such qualities, and so the 
maintenance of a high level of morale depended on virile notions 
of soldiery. According to drb scientist and Arctic military exercise 
observer Cecil Law, well trained and indoctrinated troops “could run 
circles around the mobile strike force” and were essentially no match 
in the cold against untrained and unacclimatised units.78 Military and 
defence records pertaining to Sun Dog One paint a similar picture. 
Reports suggest that Arctic acclimatisation and indoctrination was 
effective training for cold-weather military operations. Canadian troops 
never fought in an operation that would test their abilities in the cold, 
so the effectiveness of northern training remains questionable. What 
is clear is that there is no evidence to suggest that training instilled in 
troops certain innate qualities required of northern military defence. 
The development of cold-weather military masculinity was superficial. 
conclusion
This article means not to suggest that Sun Dog One is fully 
representative of Canada’s early postwar Arctic military training. 
Nor does it suggest that Sun Dog One represents the full extent of 
76  Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One,” RG 24, Volume 4206, File 270-0-89-6, LAC.
77  Matthew Farish, “Creating Cold War Climates: The Laboratories of American 
Globalism,” in J.R. McNeil and Corinna R. Unger, eds. Environmental Histories of 
the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 51–83.
78  Interview with Cecil Ernest Law [sound recordings]: CWM Oral History Project, 6 
August 2008, Interview Control Number 31D 9 LAW, Canadian War Museum Archives.
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scientific collaboration between the drb and the military. Indeed, the 
Canadian military participated in no fewer than twenty-two northern 
exercises in the first decade of the Cold War.79 Scientists featured 
regularly as observes, referees and participants. Nevertheless, Sun 
Dog One was unique. When Omond Solandt made his address to the 
Empire Club of Toronto on 30 March 1950, he spoke briefly about Sun 
Dog One and of the importance of collaboration between Canada, 
the United States, and Britain in defence of the Arctic. In his mind, 
exercises Sweetbriar and Sun Dog One had collectively demonstrated 
that two or more sovereign nations could effectively carry out joint 
military exercises in severe cold conditions. Solandt’s speech was a 
clear and public Cold War message that the Canadian military and 
defence establishment was fully committed to Arctic defence, and 
was not alone in its stand. Yet when discussing the importance of 
northern military operations to the Canadian public, Solandt and 
other military and defence representatives chose to highlight only the 
benefits of indoctrination training and joint operational execution. It 
seems the specifics of vitamin C research and acclimatisation testing 
went unknown to the public, but evidence has survived though 
military and defence records as well as published medical reports. 
Available evidence makes clear that in the immediate postwar 
period the Canadian army sought a deeper understanding of the 
many characteristics of winter warfare and in its search embraced 
experimental scientific study in an attempt to deduce information 
unique to the development of cold-weather soldiery. Northern 
environmental conditions required special investigation because the 
Canadian Arctic and sub-Arctic climate deviated significantly from 
the conditions under which most of the army’s concepts, doctrine, 
and tactics were developed.80 Operational researchers and defence 
scientists contributed at the time by collecting raw data for further 
analysis through participatory study of the army’s physical training 
exercises. Men were the chosen test subjects. 
Although not surprising considering what little reference they 
receive in the lexicon of Canada’s military history, terms such as 
acclimatisation and indoctrination find little reference with the 
Canadian military establishment. This should be of particular
79  See note 2.
80  Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 87.
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concern to scholars of Canada’s military in the Cold War, because 
together acclimatisation and indoctrination comprised the base 
upon which a unique form of military preparedness developed in 
northern Canada in the early postwar years. Canada’s postwar 
military doctrine derived from societal factors and the nature of the 
Cold War within which science, defence, and diplomacy occurred. 
As evident by cold-weather research and training conducted at Fort 
Churchill and as part of Sun Dog One, defence science, in addition to 
geopolitics, shaped Canada’s Cold War national security apparatus. 
Cold-weather testing on male troops supported and perpetuated 
idealised notions of virile soldiery. Involving researchers and scientists 
in important military investigations on northern warfare developed, 
in theory, a model for future combat development work. From proper 
scientific analyses in climatic conditions, the Canadian military 
and defence establishment hoped to derive information to improve 
operational concepts, doctrine, and tactical principles pertinent to cold-
weather warfare.81 Sufficient knowledge and adequately satisfactory 
research material was deemed to have been obtained because of Sun 
Dog One and other comparable cold-weather exercises. The negative 
consequences that resulted from acclimatisation research appear 
only briefly in available records. Researchers desired the potential 
benefits of cold-weather scientific discovery in spite of any moral or 
ethical issues that stemmed from human testing. While additional 
research is required to elucidate the deep implications of postwar 
defence science in Canada, it seems safe to suggest that the human 
and environmental legacy of Cold War militarism deserves attention.
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